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We reconsider the issue of capital income taxation in an OLG perpetual
youth framework. We show that the long run zero tax result does not gen-
erally hold. Besides the “life-cycle” motive pointed at by recent works, this
work unveils two other forces pushing toward the taxation of capital income:
the disconnection between generations and the relationship between the gov-
ernment and the individual intertemporal discount rates. We also show as a
special case, that the non zero tax result applies also if age dependent taxes
are not available, provided that the life-cycle behavior is ruled out, which
cannot happen in the standard OLG models. Finally, it emerges that unfair
life insurance contracts do not qualitatively aﬀect the results.
Journal of Economic Literature Classiﬁcation Numbers: E62, H21.
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Since the seminal works by Judd [14] and Chamley [6], there has been a
growing number of contributions dealing with the issue of dynamic optimal
capital income taxation. In particular, these two authors argued that the
long run tax rate on capital income should be zero. This somehow strik-
ing result has been clariﬁed only recently by a few works that have, on the
one hand, highlighted the strict similarity with the more traditional static
optimal taxation principles and, on the other hand, formally derived the
conditions under which it can hold. In particular, Judd [15] has shown that
the zero tax rate result descends directly from the fact that a tax on capital
income is equivalent to a tax on future consumption increasing over time:
thus, capital income should not be taxed if the elasticity of consumption is
constant over time. However, as far as inﬁnitely lived representative agent
(ILRA) models are concerned1, while this condition is necessarily true in the
steady state, along the transition path, instead, it holds only if the utility
function is (weakly) separable in consumption and leisure and homothetic
in consumption. Moreover, both De Bonis and Spataro [9] and Erosa and
Gervais [10]2 point out that, when separability is assumed out, the violation
of the zero tax principle stems from the well known Corlett-Hague [8] rule:
since leisure cannot be taxed directly, the second best solution is to tax (sub-
sidize) the good that is more (less) complementary to it, i.e. consumption.
A further insight into the mechanism driving the mentioned result has
been given by the adoption of the Overlapping Generation models with life
cycle (OLG-LC). As shown by a number of authors3, in this setup a non
zero tax rate result holds in general, even in the long run, since the optimal
consumption and labor plan is not generally constant over life, because of
life-cycle behavior4.
1See Atkeson et al. [1]. Among other articles focusing on the optimal capital income
taxation problem see Jones et al. [13], dealing with human capital accumulation, and
Chari et al. [7], Zhu [22] and Yakadina [21], dealing with stochastic frameworks.
2Both articles adopt the primal approach to the Ramsey problem; however, the former
deals with an ILRA model, while the latter with an overlapping generation one.
3See Atkinson and Sandmo [2], Erosa and Gervais [11] and Garriga [12]; for a review
see Renstr¨ om [19] and Erosa and Gervais [10].
4In this model a crucial condition for the government to implement the “second best”
policy is the availability of age-dependent taxes. The other central hypothesis, which is
common to all the models mentioned above, is the presence of a “commitment technology”,
in order to guarantee the credibility of the capital taxation announced policy.
1The aim of this work is to extend the analysis of optimal dynamic tax-
ation by considering an OLG-perpetual youth (PY) model ` a la Blanchard
[4] with growing population5. This extension enables us to encompass the
issues mentioned above which, up to now, have been studied separately or
under special assumptions. In fact by adopting the PY framework we can
deal with overlapping generations, ﬁnite (expected) life-time horizon (via
a constant instantaneous probability of death), life-cycle behavior and in-
vestigate the role played by both the intertemporal and intergenerational
discount rates of the policymaker.
As known, the PY framework implies the existence of life insurance con-
tracts, which individuals subscribe in order to oﬀset the risk of dying; in
this paper we allow also for a special kind of imperfection in the credit mar-
ket, namely unfair life insurance contracts: this means that, in principle,
individuals in each period can receive insurance payments that are diﬀerent
(and typically lower) than the actuarially fair ones.
The main results can be summarized as follows: ﬁrst, similarly to the
ILRA models, if the intertemporal elasticity of consumption is constant and
the OLG mechanism is absent, the zero tax rule obtains even in the presence
of a probability of dying.
Second, when the government is more (less) impatient than individuals
(so that public and private intertemporal discount rates diﬀer), the former
ﬁnds it optimal to levy positive (negative) taxes due to Pigouvian correction
motives: in fact, by doing this it lowers (increases) the current rhythm of
over (under) accumulation of capital. However, when contrasting the ben-
eﬁts of such policies with the associated deadweight losses of distortionary
taxation, we end up with an asymmetric result as for the long run: in fact,
when the government is more patient, the current value of the distortion
generated by capital income taxation tends to zero, so that it is still optimal
to subsidize future consumption; on the contrary, when the government is
less patient, such a distortion explodes to inﬁnity, so that taxation must
be zero. The asymmetry in the result is however ruled out in the special
case of a logarithmic utility function, that displays a unitary intertemporal
elasticity of substitution, since the change of future interest rates induced
by the tax does not aﬀect the planned consumption pattern6.
5Buiter [5] and Weil [20] amend the Blanchard’s model by allowing for population
dynamics.
6The result is obtained by arguments equivalent to those in Lansing, even if the con-
2Third, diﬀerently from the ILRA and similarly to the OLG-LC models,
another source of non zero taxation in the long run stems from the dynamics
of the intertemporal elasticity of consumption, which, in the PY framework
is not necessarily constant at the steady state. However, even if this con-
dition does not apply (and thus even in the absence of life cycle behavior)
and the Pigouvian motive is ruled out, we ﬁnd that taxation can be non
zero if the government intergenerational discount factor changes through
time. This element is obviously absent in ILRA models, but is also usually
excluded in the OLG-LC framework, since up to now it has been taken as
constant; such assumption can be well reasonable with ﬁnite lifetime horizon
and invariant population (see, for instance, Erosa and Gervais [11]), since
the share of each cohort is typically constant through time. But this is
not the case in the PY framework if the birth rate is non zero, in that the
demographic weights of each cohort decrease over time even if the net pop-
ulation growth rate is zero. Thus, while in the existing OLG-LC models the
violation of the Judd result depends crucially on the life-cycle behavior of
consumption, in the present work the mere existence of the OLG mechanism
is suﬃcient for delivering it. In fact, we show that when agents are perpet-
ually young, in the sense that the intertemporal allocation of consumption
and leisure at each date does not depend on age, contrary to Erosa and
Gervais [11] and Garriga [12], in this (special) case in which the life-cycle
motive is ruled out, the non zero result applies. Moreover, such result holds
even if age-dependent taxes are not available.
It is worth noting that the non zero result presented here sheds light on
the scope of capital income taxation, which is the correction of suboptimal-
ity of the market allocation of an OLG economy, due to the disconnection
between generations7. In fact, in absence of altruism, in each instant new
individuals (i.e. the new born) get into the economy, whose welfare is not
cared for by the existing generations.
Finally, we also show that the case of unfair life insurance contracts
changes only the capital income tax level but not the qualitative result
presented above.
The work proceeds as follows: in the ﬁrst section we present the model
and derive the equilibrium conditions for the decentralized economy. Next,
clusion is diﬀerent, given that Lansing [17] assumes the equality between the public and
private discount rates.
7The relevance of the disconnection has been ﬁrstly analyzed by Weil [20].
3we characterize the Ramsey problem by adopting the primal approach. Fi-
nally, we present the results by focusing on the new ones. Concluding re-
marks and a technical appendix will end the work.
2 The model
We consider a neoclassical-production-closed economy in which there is a
large number of agents and ﬁrms.
Private agents, who are identical in their preferences, diﬀer as for their
date of birth s; moreover they undergo a probability of dying in each period,
equal to δ; since in each period there is also a fraction α of new born, the
population growth rate is equal to α−δ ≡ n. As a consequence, a cohort of
individuals born at date s, at time t has cardinality:
αe−δteαsN (0)
with N (0) the size of population at time 0 and s ≤ t. Now, by set-
ting N (0) equal to one, without loss of generality, the size of the whole





Furthermore, individuals oﬀer labor and capital services to ﬁrms by tak-
ing the net-of-tax factor prices, e w(s,t) and e r(s,t) as given. Firms, which are
identical to each other, own a constant return to scale technology F satisfy-
ing the Inada conditions and which transforms the factors into production-
consumption units. Finally, the government can ﬁnance an exogenous and
constant stream of public expenditure G, by issuing internal debt B(t) and
by raising proportional taxes both on interests and wages, referred to as
τk (s,t) and τl (s,t) respectively. Notice that taxes can in principle be con-
ditioned on the date of birth8.
8This strong assumption can be ruled out if one eliminates life cycle behavior, since the
individual growth rate of consumption is then independent of individual characteristics.
Our results, in fact, do not rely on it.
42.1 Private agents
The agents’ preferences can be represented by the following instantaneous
utility function:
U (c(s,t),l(s,t))
where c(s,t) and l(s,t) are instantaneous consumption and labor supply
respectively of individuals of cohort s, as of instant t. Such utility function is
strictly increasing in consumption and decreasing in labor, strictly concave,
and satisﬁes the standard Inada conditions.
Agents maximize the (expected) discounted sum of lifetime utils by
choosing the optimal time path of consumption (savings) and labor hours








sub ˙ a(s,t) =

e r(s,t) +e δr (s,t)






s(e r(s,v)+e δr(s,v))dv = 0, a(s,s) = a
where β is the intertemporal discount rate, a the agent’s wealth; the
notation
.
() indicates the derivative with respect to time, while e r(s,t) =
r(t)
 
1 − τk (s,t)

and e w(s,t) = w(t)
 
1 − τl (s,t)

are the net-of-tax factor
prices. Notice that e δr is the instantaneous ﬂow of income due to insurance
(net of capital taxes)9; moreover, δr, the gross value, may diﬀer from the
actuarially fair value δ, due to market imperfections.
The FOCs of this problem imply:
Uc(s,t) = p(s,t) (3)
Ul(s,t) = −p(s,t) e w(s,t) (4)
−
h
˜ r(s,t) +e δr (s,t)
i
p(s,t) = ˙ p(s,t) − (β + δ)p(s,t) (5)
9We assume here that the government taxes also life insurance payments; however, our
results do not change qualitatively if this assumption is abandoned.
5where the expression Ui(t) is the partial derivative of the utility function
with respect to argument i = c,l at time t and p(s,t) is the current value
shadow price of wealth. According to such conditions, it can be shown that



































with θj = −
Ujjj
Uj , j = c,l, the elasticity of the marginal utility and θij =
−
Uijj
Ui . Notice that, in case the utility function is additively separable in con-
sumption and labor, the growth rates above are: ˙ c
c =














Since ﬁrms run their business in a perfectly competitive framework, in each
instant they hire capital and labor services according to their market prices
(gross of taxes) and in order to maximize current period proﬁts. This means













Due to the assumed identity of the ﬁrms and the presence of a CRS
technology, such conditions can also be expressed for the economy as a
whole, in per capita terms:
fk(t) = r(t) (8’)





−∞ νp (s,t)l(s,t)ds, in which νp (s,t) = αe−α(t−s)
is the weight of cohort s in the whole population at period t.
62.3 The government and market clearing conditions
The government ﬁxes an amount of exogenous public expenditure and ﬁ-
nances it through taxes on income and by issuing debt. There is no con-
straint on the amount of debt (neither on the levels nor on the growth
rates)10. We assume that the government has access to a commitment tech-
nology that prevents it from revising the announced path of distortionary
tax rates whenever the possibility of lump sum taxation arises11. Thus, one
obtains the usual condition:
.
B (t) = r(t)B (t) + G − T (t). (10)
Finally, since the market clearing condition implies that, at each date,
the sum of capital and debt equal the aggregate private wealth, that is:
A(t) = K (t) + B (t), (11)






e r(s,t) +e δr (s,t)

b(s,t) + τl (s,t)w(t)l(s,t)
+(δr − δ)b(s,t) + τk (s,t)(r(t) + δr (s,t))k(s,t) − g
i
ds = 0. (12)
3 The Ramsey problem
Since the primal approach to the Ramsey [18] problem consists in the maxi-
mization of a direct utility function through the choice of quantities (i.e. al-
locations)12, a key point is restricting the set of allocations among which the









= 0, and the starting condition B (0) = B.
11This point concerns the “time inconsistency” problem aﬀecting optimal taxation when
a dynamic set up is considered: typically, the government has incentives to deviate from the
announced (ex-ante) second best policy, upon achieving the instant in which the policy
is phased in; in fact this happens because the stock of accumulated capital ex-post is
perfectly rigid and now should be taxed more heavily, since this would mimic a lump sum
taxation. The commitment hypothesis implies also that the capital tax at the beginning
of the policy is given, that is, ﬁxed exogenously at a level belonging to the (0,1) interval.
12See Atkinson and Stiglitz [3]; on the other hand, the “dual” approach takes prices and
tax rates as control variables (see Chamley [6] and Renstr¨ om [19] for some examples).
7government can choose to those that can be decentralized as a competitive
equilibrium. Thus, in this paragraph we deﬁne a competitive equilibrium
and the constraints that must be imposed to the policymaker problem, in
order to achieve such a competitive outcome.
The ﬁrst constraint can be obtained as follows: ﬁrst, by taking eq. (2)
and multiplying both sides by e−
R t











s[e r(s,v)+e δr(s,v)]dv [e w(s,t)l(s,t) − c(s,t)];
next, by multiplying both sides by p(s,t) and exploiting the individuals’























= e−(β+δ)(t−s) [Ul (s,t)l(s,t) + Uc (s,t)c(s,t)];







dt = a(s,s)Uc(s,s), ∀s, (13)
which is referred to as the “implementability constraint”13.
As for the second constraint, writing eq. (2) in the following way:
˙ a(s,t) = [r(t) + δr]a(s,t) + w(t)l(s,t) − c(s,t)
−τk (s,t)[r(s,t) + δr]a(s,t) − τl (s,t)w(t)l(s,t); (14)
integrating over the population to get the aggregate wealth:
13Such constraint must be satisﬁed ∀s. In the rest of the paper we assume for simplicity


















where a(t,t) is the initial wealth of individuals, which is supposed to be
zero.
The expression above can be written as:
.





so that, including (14) into (15), we obtain:
.









where C (t) and W (t) are aggregate consumption and gross aggregate
wages, respectively. Note that the sum of the two integrals in eq. (16) is
the total amount of revenues, T (t).
Finally, recalling the law of motion of aggregate debt, exploiting the
market clearing condition and substituting the expression for T (t) of (10)
into (16), we get:
.
K (t) = (δr − δ)(K(t) + B (t)) + r(t)K (t) + W (t) − C (t) − G, (17)




k(s,t) − (δ + r(t))k(s,t) − w(t)l(s,t)
9−(δr − δ)(b(s,t) + k(s,t)) + c(s,t) + g]ds = 0. (18)
Such expression is usually referred to as the “feasibility constraint”.
We can now give the following deﬁnition:





0 , b) allocations {c(s,t),l(s,t),k(s,t)}
∞
0
and c) prices {w(t),r(t)}
∞
0 such that, at each instant t: b) satisﬁes eq.
(1) subject to (2), given a) and c); c) satisﬁes eq. (80) and eq. (90); eqs.
(18) and (12) are satisﬁed.
Such allocations are often referred to as “implementable”.
In the light of the deﬁnition given above, the following proposition holds:
Proposition 1 An allocation is a competitive equilibrium if and only if it
satisﬁes implementability and feasibility.
Proof. The ﬁrst part of the proposition is true by construction. The
reverse (any allocation satisfying implementability and feasibility is a com-
petitive equilibrium) is provided in Appendix A.
3.1 Solution
Let us suppose that the policy is introduced at the end of period t0.


















k(s,t) − (δ + r(t))k(s,t) − w(t)l(s,t) +
−(δr − δ)(b(s,t) + k(s,t)) + c(s,t) + g]ds = 0, ∀t > t0,
14We incorporate the implementability constraint into the maximand, λ being the mul-






max(s,t0)(e r(s,v)+e δr(s,v))dv = 0, a(s,t0) given, ∀s
where µg (s,t) and γg are the weight that the government attaches to
the generation born in year s and the government discount rate, respec-
tively15, µp = αeαs−δt the size of cohort s and λ is the current value
multiplier associated to the implementability constraint, deﬁned as λ(t) =
λe(γ−(β+δ))(t−max(s,t0)).
Now, by diﬀerentiating the feasibility constraint we get16:
c(s,t) = −
.
k(s,t)+(δ + r(t))k(s,t)+w(t)l(s,t)+(δr − δ)(b(s,t) + k(s,t))−g.
By substituting it into the problem and by applying the calculus of




































1 + λ(1 + Hc)

(r + δr) − γgµgUc



























15Note that, in principle, the former parameter may depend also on t. Moreover, we
omit the government budget constraint since, by Walras’ law, it is satisﬁed if the imple-
mentability and feasibility constraints hold.








l (s,t)w(t)l(s,t) + (δr − δ)b(s,t) + τ
k (s,t)(r(t) + δr (s,t))k (s,t) − g = 0.
This means that the public balance is divided into “generational” accounts, the dynam-
ics of which is controlled by the government via labor and capital income taxes speciﬁc to
each generation.
17From now onward, we omit both the s and t indexes, when it does not generate
ambiguity.
18See Appendix B for the solution conditions of this problem. Note that the interiority
of the solution is guaranteed by the Inada conditions. However, the FOCs are necessary
but not suﬃcient due to the possible non convexity of the implementability constraint.
The solution for l is omitted for brevity.
11where the term Hi =
Uiii+Ujij
Ui is what is usually referred to as the “gen-
eral equilibrium elasticity”. Now, by dividing expression (19) by Ucµg

1 + λ(1 + Hc)

,


































Substituting for the growth rate of consumption stemming from the in-
dividual optimization condition (eq. (6)), we get the expression for the






























4 Discussion of the results
We now discuss the results concerning capital income taxation, in both the
short and the long run.
Preliminarily, it is worth noting that eq. (20) does not yield an explicit
formula for τk, since Hc depends upon the tax rate itself19.
Next, eq. (20) shows that the imperfection in the insurance market does
not determine whether the tax rate is diﬀerent from zero or not, since it
appears only in the denominator.
We can now state the following proposition:
Proposition 2 If the economy converges to a steady state, along the tran-





µg = 0 and γg = (β +δ). At the steady state the capital




µg = 0 and γg ≥ β + δ
or b) γg < β + δ and







19Moreover, we do not have any condition ensuring that the tax rate will be in the (0,1)
interval, while we would suspect capital taxes to get sticking at the interval boundary for
a (ﬁnite) period of time since the introduction of the policy. However, in the rest of the
work we maintain the assumption of interiority of the equilibrium tax rates, for t > 0.
12Proof. As for the transition phase, the proof is straightforward by
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As for the steady state, to better understand the implications of the
model, we distinguish three cases, according to whether the policymaker
discount rate γg is equal, higher or lower than the individual one.
























3. γg < β + δ. λ → 0 and τk = 1
fk+δr
h








From the proposition above, it emerges that there are four independent





diﬀerence between the government (γg) and individual (β+δ) intertemporal
discount factors; this also determines the third factor, i.e. 3) the dynamics
of λ, the multiplier on the implementability constraint; 4) the dynamics of
the social intergenerational weight (
.
µg); .We can now brieﬂy comment the
role of the factors determining the optimal tax rate.
4.1 The role of the utility function
Factor 1) has been widely discussed in the literature:
.
Hc = 0 obtains if
one assumes that the utility function is homothetic in consumption and
(weakly) separable in consumption and leisure. Otherwise, future consump-
tion is taxed/subsidized if consumption demand is getting more/less inelas-
tic. Moreover, as recalled above, this factor marks the diﬀerence between
the ILRA and the OLG-LC models as for the steady state result: in fact, in
OLG models (and also in the PY version) Hc can vary with age even at the
steady state. However, as shown in eq. (20), even in the absence of a life
cycle, in the present model the non zero tax rule can still apply.
134.2 The role of the time discounting rates
Factors 2) and 3) can be discussed together, since they are both dependent
on the relationship between the government and individual time discount




Hcare equal to zero. If
γg = β + δ (or δ = 0 and γg = β), then there is no scope for capital income
taxation, either along the transition path or at the steady state (see Erosa
and Gervais [11]). The diﬀerence between γg and (β + δ), instead, opens
the way to a Pigouvian correction. For the case of β + δ > γ, individuals
are discounting the future at a rate that is higher than the government
one. As a consequence, since they are consuming at a too high rate, the
government ﬁnds it optimal to subsidize capital, that is, future consumption.
The same reasoning, with opposite conclusions, applies in the second case
(β+δ < γ). In both situations, however, it is worth noting that the tax rate
is inversely proportional λ, which is usually interpreted as the (current value
of the distortion) brought about by non lump-sum taxation. As expected,
this relationship shown that, in general, increasing the capital income tax
worsens the overall deadweight loss. However, in the ﬁrst case this parameter
tends to zero, while it gets bigger towards inﬁnity in the other case. As a
consequence, in the long run, when λ decreases through time, there is still
room for subsidizing future consumption (i.e. current capital income). On
the other hand, when λ raises exponentially to inﬁnity, the distortionary
eﬀect overwhelms the welfare improvement due to the Pigouvian correction.
Hence, the government, which cares relatively less about the present than
individuals do, ﬁnds it optimal to announce a zero capital income tax for
the long run. The only exception for such asymmetry in the result is the
case of a logarithmic utility function, with Hc = −1. In fact, since the
utility function displays a unitary intertemporal elasticity of substitution,
the substitution and the income eﬀect generated by an interest rate variation
(due to taxation) cancel out. Hence, the change of future interest rates, that
is, the change of the relative prices of future consumption, does not distort
the individual consumption/saving allocation. As a consequence, the long
run tax can be positive and equal to
γg−(β+δ)
fk+δr .
4.3 The role of the intergenerational discount factor
As for factor 4), its role can be isolated by supposing γ =(β+δ) and
.
Hc = 0.




fk+δr, which is diﬀerent from zero provided that µg, the weight
14assigned to each cohort by the government, is constant through time. This
assumption is made in the existing OLG-LC models (see, in particular, Erosa
and Gervais [11] and Garriga [12]: this element, together with the equality
between the government and the individual intertemporal discount rates,
leads to zero taxation in the absence of life cycle, i.e.
.
Hc = 0. However, this
is typically not the case in this set up. Let us consider the situation in which
the social intergenerational weight is equal to the actual demographic weight
of each cohort within the population, i.e. µg =
µp
ent. Given our assumption
of a constant probability of death δ and a constant birth rate α, the relative
size of each cohort is decreasing through time, so that
.
µg
µg = α for each
cohort and, hence, the tax is τk = α
fk+δr. This new result clariﬁes that
an independent source of taxation is represented by the “disconnection” of
the economy, which is typical of OLG models: in fact, given the dynamics
of µg, the government discriminates future consumption in favour of the
present one; under a diﬀerent perspective, one can note that at each date
individuals tend to oversave relatively to what could maximize welfare, since
they do not take into consideration the new born of the economy. In fact
these individuals at each date provide extra resources for redistributing (at
least the burden of taxation) among the existing generations (it is easy to
show that, if individuals were altruistic towards their descendants, the JC
zero tax rule would be restored).
Moreover, at least at the steady state, such tax does not depend on age.
Erosa and Gervais have shown that, when age-dependent taxes are not avail-
able, the zero tax result does not generally apply in OLG models, since new
constraints featuring the problem are violated (that is, the equality of the
marginal rates of substitution of consumption among individuals of diﬀer-
ent cohorts). In our case, however, it is easy to show that such constraints
(which take the form of the equality of consumption growth rates among
individuals) are satisﬁed in the absence of life-cycle behavior (i.e. when
.
Hc = 0)20.
As for the case of γg 6= β +δ,when γg > β +δ, along the transition path
both factors drive to a positive taxation of capital income. As for individual
consumption, the eﬀects of such a policy are, ceteris paribus, to lower its
growth rate with respect to that obtaining without taxation. On the other
20This property of the model can be veriﬁed by looking at eq. 6, which is constant
for each individual if θc and θcl are constant among individuals, and by reckoning that
Hc = −(θc + θcl).
15hand, in case γg < β+δ, there is a contrasting force at work: in fact, since the
government is more forward looking (i.e. less impatient) than individuals,
it tends to subsidize future consumption; therefore, the sign of the tax will
depend on which force prevails. As for the steady state, in the ﬁrst case
factor 1) becomes irrelevant because the cost of using distortionary taxation
tends to inﬁnity. In the second one, instead, τk = 1
fk+δr
 
γg − β − δ + α

,
which is zero only if γg = β − n. As a consequence, the zero tax result
emerges in two very special cases, i.e. when γg = (β − n) or γg =(β + δ)
and α = 0.
5 Conclusions
We tackle the issue of taxing capital income in a perpetual youth model
` a la Blanchard (i.e. an overlapping generation framework with individuals
facing a constant probability of dying) by applying the primal approach to
the Ramsey problem. Although less handleable than the traditional ones,
this extension enables us to provide a more general model which, on the
one hand, encompasses most of the existing results obtained in separated
frameworks, and, on the other hand, delivers new insights.
The thrust of the paper is that several forces are at work leading to a
non zero tax rate, in both the short and the long run.
Namely, we unveil the presence of four forces: a) the dynamics of the
general equilibrium elasticity of consumption (Hc); b) the diﬀerence between
the government and individual intertemporal discount rates, which also de-
termines c) the dynamics of the distortionary cost of taxation as for the
government; d) the dynamics of the social intergenerational discount rate;
in the case this corresponds to the actual share of each cohort within the
population, this leads to a positive taxation of capital income proportionally
to the birth rate.
The ﬁrst factor has been widely discussed in the literature: given the
equivalence between capital income and future consumption taxation, it is
convenient to hit the latter relatively more if the intertemporal elasticity of
consumption is decreasing. The economic intuition underlying the role of
factor b) and c) is the following: the diﬀerent degree of patience between
the policy maker and individuals generates an incentive for the former to
levy positive or negative taxes on capital for a Pigouvian correction; pre-
cisely, when the policymaker is less (more) patient than individuals, it ﬁnds
16it optimal to levy a positive (negative) tax on capital income, so as to lower
(increase) the current consumption growth rate. However, the beneﬁts of
such policy must be confronted with the cost of using distortionary taxa-
tion. In fact, the positive taxation policy leads to an explosive distortionary
eﬀect, which prevents the government to implement it. The only case in
which such distortionary eﬀect does not play any role is that of unitary elas-
ticity of substitution of consumption (i.e. logarithmic utility): in fact, in
this case future change of the interest rate caused by policy does not dis-
tort the consumption pattern chosen by individuals (since the income and
substitution eﬀects cancel out): hence, the government has room again for
positive taxation of interest income.
Finally, factor d) while being absent in both ILRA models and in OLG
ones with constant population, plays a crucial role when, as it is likely to
happen in the real world, the dynamics of the population is more compli-
cated. We show that, in a PY framework, both the size and the demographic
weight of cohorts decrease, so that a varying social intergenerational dis-
count rate appears a sensible rather than an ad hoc assumption. In fact,
when the latter equals the actual share of each generation, a positive tax
on capital income turns out to be optimal. This occurs because individu-
als, who are disconnected to each other, do not take into account the fact
that the arrival of the new born, at each date provides extra resources for
an intergenerational redistribution of the burden of taxation. On the other
hand, by reckoning this possibility, the government reduces the oversaving
of individuals by hitting future consumption proportionally to the birth rate
of the economy.
Concluding, from the analysis above it turns out that the violation of
the Chamley Judd rule does crucially depend upon the assumption of OLG
(without altruism) and/or ﬁnite lifetime horizon. In fact such devices gener-
ate a diﬀerence between the optimal rate of individual consumption growth
and that resulting in the absence of taxation, which thus gives room to
corrective public intervention. However, diﬀerently from the existing OLG-
LC models, the presence of life cycle behavior is not a necessary condition
for the non zero tax result, which obtains even if the government and in-
dividual discount rates are equal and the general equilibrium elasticity of
consumption is constant.
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6 Appendix A: Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Since a competitive equilibrium (or implementable allocation) satis-
ﬁes both the feasibility and the implementability constraints by construction,
in this Appendix we demonstrate the reverse of Proposition 1: any feasible
allocation satisfying implementability is a competitive equilibrium.
Suppose that an allocation satisﬁes the implementability and the fea-
sibility constraints. Then, deﬁne a sequence of after tax prices as follows:













, with p(s,t) =
Uc(s,t),∀s and ∀t, and a sequence of before tax prices as: fk(t) = r(t) and
fl(t) = w(t). As a consequence, by construction such allocation satisﬁes
both the consumers’ and ﬁrms’ optimality conditions.
19The second step is to show that the allocation satisﬁes the consumer bud-
get constraint. Take the implementability constraint and substitute Uc(s,t),
Ul(s,t) by using the expressions above:
Z ∞
s
e−(β+δ)(t−s) [p(s,t)c(s,t) − e w(s,t)p(s,t)l(s,t)]dt = a(s,s)p(s,s), ∀s







s[e r(s,v)+e δr(s,v)−(β+δ)]dv [c(s,t) − e w(s,t)l(s,t)]dt = a(s,s)p(s,s).
Finally, by eliminating p(s,s) and deﬁning c(s,t) − e w(s,t)l(s,t) =
e r(s,t)q (s,t) −
.
















0[e r(s,v)+e δr(s,v)]dv = 0.
Finally, as for the public sector budget constraint, by substituting the
expression for consumption obtainable by the individual budget constraint




k(s,t) − (δ + r(t))k(s,t) − w(t)l(s,t) − (δr − δ)(b(s,t) + k(s,t))
−˙ a(s,t) +

e r(s,t) +e δr (s,t)

a(s,t) + e w(s,t)l(s,t) + g
i
ds = 0.
Finally, by deﬁning b(t) = k(t) − a(t) and exploiting the deﬁnition of






e r(s,t) +e δr (s,t)

b(s,t) + τl (s,t)w(t)l(s,t) − g
+(δr − δ)b(s,t) + τk (s,t)(r(t) + δr (s,t))k(s,t)
i
ds = 0,
which is eq. (12) in the text.
21The equations below hold ∀s.
207 Appendix B: The “calculus of variations” method
We now sketch the strategy adopted for solving the Ramsey problem pre-
sented in Section 3.1.
Following Kamien and Schwartz [16], suppose the problem has the form
max
Z Z
F (t,s,x(t,s),xt (t,s),xs (t,s))dsdt
where the symbol xy indicate the partial derivatives of variable x with
respect to y (x can be also a vector of variables). The Euler equation for
such a problem is the following:
Fx − ∂Fxt/∂t − ∂Fxs/∂s = 0.
Moreover, in case the problem contains also a (double) integral con-
straint, such as:
Z Z
q (t,s,x(t,s),xt (t,s),xs (t,s))dsdt = 0,
this constraint can be appended to the integrand with a multiplier func-
tion λ(t,s), so that, if the solution x∗ maximizing F subject to the constraint
does exist, then there is a function λ(t,s) such that x∗ satisﬁes the Euler
equations for
Z Z
(F + λq)dsdt.
21